What is a philosophical peira? : Some reflections on Plato&apos;s Seventh Letter 340b-341b by F. Forcignano&apos
Parnassos Press – Fonte Aretusa
 
 
Chapter Title: What is a philosophical πεῖρα? Some reflections on Plato’s Seventh Letter
340b-341b
Chapter Author(s): Filippo Forcignanò
 
Book Title: Plato at Syracuse
Book Subtitle: Essays on Plato in Western Greece with a new translation of the Seventh
Letter by Jonah Radding
Book Editor(s): Heather L. Reid, Mark Ralkowski
Published by: Parnassos Press – Fonte Aretusa. (2019)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvcmxptk.12
 
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
 
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.
Parnassos Press – Fonte Aretusa is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and
extend access to Plato at Syracuse
This content downloaded from 159.149.205.107 on Fri, 15 Mar 2019 15:56:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 149 
Filippo Forcignanò1 
What is a philosophical πεῖρα?  
Some reflections on Plato’s Seventh Letter 340b-341b 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss lines 340b-341b of Plato’s 
Seventh Letter, which describe the meeting between the philosopher 
and Dionysius II at the time of his last trip to Syracuse. Plato had 
good reasons to embark on this journey and to test Dionysius II’s love 
of philosophy: several people worthy of esteem (Dion, Archytas, 
others from Tarentum, some Athenians) had attested to the fact that 
the young tyrant was sincerely passionate about philosophy. Plato 
himself was confident of the possibility that “a young man of native 
intelligence who has accidentally heard some talk of lofty matters 
should conceive a desire to live a better life” (see Seventh Letter, 339d-
e). At any rate, by the time of his last trip Plato was sufficiently used 
to life's challenges to know that it is always good to test people’s 
reputation and attitudes. Putting Dionysius II to the test was 
therefore an absolute priority. In this essay, I argue that (i) the πεῖρα 
had no theoretical content, but it was a test of Dionysius II’s skills, 
attitute, and way of life; (ii) Dionysius II’s book was in itself an 
indication of his ignorance and inadequacy as a philosopher; (iii) the 
Protagoras offers an interesting and similar use of the verb πειράζω.  
The word πεῖρα, according to the Lexique de Platon by E. De 
Places, has two main meanings: test and proof. In the first meaning, it 
is used to say “give proof of one’s own quality” (Laches 189b5: 
ἔδωκας σαυτοῦ πεῖραν ἀρετῆς ἣν χρὴ διδόναι μέλλοντα δικαίως 
δώσειν, “you have given the proof of your value that one who wants 
to do things the right way must give”). But the word πεῖρα also 
means “to test someone,” or “to test one’s qualities.” It is used this 
way at Euthydemus 275b5, for instance, where Socrates asks his 
interlocutors to “test Clinias and to discuss with him” (λάβετον 
πεῖραν τοῦ μειρακίου καὶ διαλέχθητον ἐναντίον ἡμῶν). In this 
sense, the verb πειρᾶσθαι is similar to βασανίζειν, in the way it is 
used in Laches 187e6 ff.: being tested by Socrates (ὑπὸ Σωκράτους 
                                                     
1 Filippo Forcignanò teaches History of Ancient Philosophy at the State University 
of Milan (Italy).  
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βασανίζεσθαι) implies to account for one’s present and past lifestyle. 
The philosophical πεῖρα is always also an examination of one’s life, 
not only of one’s opinions. But it is also possible to use the word to 
mean “to test something.” For instance, in Charmides 171a3 we read 
that the σώφρων knows that the doctor has some science, but it is 
necessary to test what sort it is, because each science is defined as not 
just a science, but a science of some thing.  
Upon his arrival in Syracuse, Plato met Dionysius II precisely in 
order to verify the young man’s passion for philosophy (340a): 
When I arrived, I thought my first task was to prove (ἔλεγχον 
δεῖν λαβεῖν) whether Dionysius was really on fire with 
philosophy (ἐξημμένος ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας), or whether the many 
reports that came to Athens were false. Now there is a certain 
way of putting this to a test (ἔστιν δή τις τρόπος τοῦ περὶ τὰ 
τοιαῦτα πεῖραν λαμβάνειν), a dignified way and quite 
appropriate to tyrants, especially to those whose heads are full 
of philosophical commonplaces (and I saw at once, upon my 
arrival, that this was especially true of Dionysius) [transl. 
Morrow].  
In this context ἔλεγχος has the same meaning as πεῖρα: test. The verb 
πειράζω with the personal accusative means “to try, tempt a person, 
put him to a test” (LSJ). In this sense, a πεῖρα is a sort of exam that 
someone gives to another to verify their skills and attitudes. For 
instance, when a person asks to join a sports team, the coach routinely 
asks them to display their abilities, skills, and techniques, in order to 
evaluate their future contribution to the team, their appropriate role 
in it and, more radically, whether they should join the team at all. 
Analogously, when a person asks for admission to a selective school, 
for instance a famous piano school, it is normal for the teacher to test 
the prospective pupil: do they have the right motivation? The right 
skills? Do they understand the tasks required by the school? Do they 
really have a sincere passion for the discipline? There are many tests 
and many situations in which it makes sense to be tested in this way. 
We learn from Plato’s dialogues and the Seventh Letter that there is 
also a Platonic philosophical test.  
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The passages quoted above clarify that the test which Plato has 
in mind is a well-established test, not an impromptu one. It is a sort 
of customary evaluation that a philosopher should resort to when 
meeting a prospective new pupil. Before going into the details of the 
πεῖρα to which Plato subjected Dionysius II, we have to ask whether 
there are any similar situations to be found in the Platonic dialogues. 
We find a similar context and an analogous use of the verb πειράζω 
at the beginning of the Protagoras. Let me summarize the context. 
Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, shows up at Socrates's home one 
night, shouting with joy: “Protagoras is in the city!” Socrates tries to 
downplay the matter: “What do you care? Protagoras hasn’t done 
you a wrong, has he?” [transl. Allen]. Hippocrates answers: 
“Heavens no, Socrates. Except maybe that only he is wise (γε μόνος 
ἐστὶ σοφός) and doesn’t make me so.” Socrates replies that it’s just a 
fact of money and persuasion: “If you give him money and persuade 
him he’ll make you wise too” (310d). Of course, Socrates knows very 
well that this is false (being wise is not the result of having passively 
followed some lessons), but he teases Hippocrates, who does not 
understand his interlocutor's irony and indeed asks Socrates to 
intercede for him with Protagoras. Since the hour is very early, 
Socrates proposes to while the time away by chatting and taking a 
stroll in the courtyard. The way Socrates presents this conversation 
is of the utmost interest for the purpose of this paper: 
καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἰπποκράτους τῆς ὁρμῆς 
διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν καὶ ἠρώτον 
and I examined Hippocrates, questioning him to test his mettle. 
The verb ἀποπειράομαι is rather infrequent in Plato: it occurs 
just eight times in the dialogues, three of which are in the Protagoras. 
In no other passage is it used in relation to a potential pupil in order 
to test his intentions and skills. It is true that Hippocrates wants to be 
a pupil of Protagoras, and not Socrates, but this does not change the 
type of question Socrates submits to him. The most important thing 
to note is that this verb anticipates two very important occurrences 
of πεῖραν λαμβάνειν in a passage on the difference between the 
exegesis of poetry and philosophical discussions, 347c-348a: 
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Actually, I think discussing poetry is much like attending 
the drinking parties of worthless and vulgar people. They’re 
unable to associate with each other through their own voice 
and words, due to their lack of education, so they run up the 
price of flute girls and spend a great deal for the alien voice 
of the flute, and associate with each other through such 
voices as that. But where the drinkers are gentlemen and 
properly educated, you’ll see neither flute girls nor dancing 
nor harp girls; they’re capable of associating with each other 
in their own voices without this childish nonsense, speaking 
and listening decorously each in his turn even when they’ve 
drunk a great deal of wine. So too a meeting like this, it if 
consists of men of the sort most of us claim to be, has no 
need of an alien voice, nor of poets who cannot be 
questioned about what they mean. The Many adduce them 
in argument, some claiming the poet means this, others that, 
arguing about something they cannot test. But those met in 
familiar intercourse among themselves dismiss this sort of 
meeting, and test each other by receiving and rendering 
accounts in discussions of their own (ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις 
πεῖραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες). I think you 
and I should rather imitate people like that. We should set 
aside the poets and fashion accounts with one another, 
putting the truth and ourselves to test (δι’ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς 
ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμῶν 
αὐτῶν πεῖραν λαμβάνοντας).  
Not everyone can philosophize. We can’t talk philosophy at 
every social gathering. Philosophy implies testing each other to 
verify aptitude for participating in such discussions. The πεῖρα has, 
so to speak, a double value: firstly, it tests the attitude of those who 
intend to practice philosophy; secondly, it verifies the content of what 
they say. The Seventh Letter describes the Syracusans' way of life in a 
way that is reminiscent of the bad synousiai of Protagoras (326b6 ff.): 
When I got there and saw the proverbial happy life of Sicilian 
and Italian tables, with men gorging themselves twice every day 
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and never sleeping alone at night and practicing all the other 
habits that go with these debaucheries, I was completely 
disgusted. For no man under heaven who has followed such 
practises from his youth could keep his head; so strange a temper 
is against nature. Nor would he ever learn self-control nor, 
indeed, acquire any other part of virtue. Nor can any city be at 
peace […] 
Parties, a lot of wine, the inversion of day and night: this is what the 
Sicilians call a “happy life.” There are, of course, quite a few 
differences between Sicilian feasts and Athenian symposia, and 
between the political situation in Greece (and Athens in particular) 
and that in Syracuse. But in both cases Plato links a dissolute lifestyle 
with the decline of the city. Plato does not mention poetry in the 
Seventh Letter, but we know that many important poets were invited 
to Syracuse by Dionysius I, as well as his son. Dionysius II, the scion 
of the most powerful family in Syracuse, stood, in Plato’s mind, as 
the embodiment of a non-philosophical city, exactly the opposite of 
the kallipolis.  
As is well known, the δυναστεία of Dionysius II is described in 
many sources – by historians as well as Peripatetic philosophers – as 
being characterised by constant drunkenness.2 Plutarch quotes3 
Aristotle's claim that once Dionysius II was drunk for ninety days in 
a row.4 Aristotle even defends the idea that Dion acted against the 
tyrant because he was moved by the Syracusans' hatred of him; 
indeed, they hated him because he was always drunk.5 This 
information should not be taken literally: the drunkenness of the 
tyrant is a topos in Greek literature. Plato never mentions this aspect 
in the Letter, but it is well known that he is particularly lenient 
towards Dionysius II and his vices.  
                                                     
2 See [Arist.] Probl. XXVIII, 949a, 25-28; Theofr. F 548 Fortenbaugh; see also Athen., 
X, 435d-436b, Theopomp. FGrHist 115 FF 185-88. 
3 Dio, 7, 7. 
4 F 588 Rose = F 605, 2 Gigon. 
5 Pol. V, 1312a, 4-6. 
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What did Plato and Dionysius II say during the πεῖρα?  
It is very difficult to answer this question. The Letter doesn’t give 
us this information apertis verbis. But Plato provides some clues: 
1. 341b8-9: “You must present to such a man the whole of the 
philosophic undertaking, describing what its nature is, and 
how many difficulties must be surmounted, and how much 
labor is involved” (δεικνύναι δὴ δεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὅτι ἔστι 
πᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα οἷόν τε καὶ δι' ὅσων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅσον 
πόνον ἔχει). 
2. 341c2-4: “…marvellous journey which he must at once 
undertake with all his strength, or life is not worth living” 
(ὁδόν τε ἡγεῖται θαυμαστὴν ἀκηκοέναι συντατέον τε εἶναι 
νῦν καὶ οὐ βιωτὸν ἄλλως ποιοῦντι); 
3.  d5-6: “while for the opposite kind of life he has a confirmed 
disgust” (τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ μισῶν διατελεῖ); 
4. 341a8-b1: “I did not explain all of my philosophy to him” 
(πάντα μὲν οὖν οὔτ' ἐγὼ διεξῆλθον). 
Philosophy is a long, difficult, discouraging journey, but it is the 
best journey one can make. If you live philosophically, you will hate 
the opposite kind of life. Plato surely taught these things to Dionysius 
II, but he did not explain all of his philosophy during the first – and 
last! – conversation. Was the πεῖρα something like “an introductory 
lesson in Platonic philosophy”? I don’t think so. It was just an 
aperitivo to his philosophy, as people say in Italy.  
On a more serious note, Plato did not explain to Dionysius II the 
content of his philosophy, except for a few vague hints. But he clearly 
explained that philosophy is a serious and strenuous task; a task that 
concerns one's way of life and happiness, which is why a true 
philosopher must be ready to change her or his life. For this reason, I 
disagree with those6 who think that the πεῖρα consisted in the 
                                                     
6 See G. Pasquali, Le lettere di Platone (Pisa, 1938), 75 ff.; H. Gundert, “Zum 
philosophischen Exkurs im 7. Brief,” in Idee und Zahl. Studien zur platonischen 
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philosophical excursus. As Paulo Butti de Lima has written, πεῖρα 
and excursus serve different purposes.7 The purpose of the πεῖρα was 
precisely an ἔλεγχος, and not the explanation of any philosophical 
doctrine or corpus of doctrines. In Plato’s words, the function of the 
πεῖρα is to test people and unmask those “who are pampered and 
unable to work hard” τοὺς τρυφῶντάς τε καὶ ἀδυνάτους διαπονεῖν 
(341a).8 This expression is a clear reference to 326b-d, where Plato 
describes the “happy life” of the Syracusans as a non-stop party. And 
this proves that the link between the bad symposia of the Protagoras 
and the Letter is not pie in the sky, as it may seem at first sight.  
An aspiring philosopher must possess certain physical, mental 
and attitudinal skills. This is made clear by the selection of rulers in 
the Republic. Testing them is a fundamental moment of the selection. 
For instance, it is urgent to test who will be the best defender of his 
own decision to do what is best for the city in every situation (III 
413c5-7). This test is both physical and mental: καὶ πόνους γε αὖ καὶ 
ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ἀγῶνας αὐτοῖς θετέον (“we must expose them to 
labors, pains, and agonies”). The analogy between the physical test 
of the Republic and the philosophical πεῖρα is possible because the 
gymnastikē of the Republic is not just physical training.9 Both 
philosophical and physical training contribute to forming a man who 
lives in a correct way. In addition, both tests involve labors and pains. 
Being able to bear πόνος is a fundamental philosophical skill. In a 
very significant passage of Book VII, we read that  
[the person we are looking for] must have penetration into their 
studies and ease of learning. For souls become discouraged in 
the difficulties of study more than in those of physical exercises, 
                                                     
Philosophie, hrgs. von H.-G. Gadamer and W. Schadewaldt (Heidelberg 1968), 
103 ff.; H. Krämer, Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles: zum Wesen und zur Geschichte 
der platonischen Ontologie (Amsterdam, 1959), 404-408. 
7 P. Butti de Lima, Platone: L’utopia del potere (La Settima lettera), (Venezia, 2015), 163. 
8 Radding translation from this volume. See M. Tulli, Dialettica e scrittura nella VII 
Lettera di Platone (Pisa, 1989), 14.  
9 See H. Reid, “Sport and Moral Education in Plato’s Republic, Journal of the Philosophy 
of Sport,34:1 (2007): 160-75. 
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since the labor [of study], indeed, is more peculiar to them and 
not shared with the body. […] 
And, sure, a person who has a good memory, persistence, and in 
general who is a labor-lover is to be looked for. Or in what way 
do you suppose one will be willing to bear at the same time the 
labors of the body and to complete such hard study and 
practice?”10  
Because the tests are so important, it is crucial to try to 
understand what Plato and Dionysius II told each other during their 
encounter. Indeed, to quote Tulli, “non v’è dubbio che il colloquio tra 
Dionigi e Platone si risolse nella πεῖρα.”11 Plato did not say anything 
else, but Dionysius II felt authorized to write a book on Platonic 
philosophy.12 It is hard to believe that Plato explained to Dionysius II 
that it’s impossible to write down the core of his philosophy. 
Therefore, Dionysius did not violate this prohibition. Nothing in the 
text authorizes us to assume the contrary. The link between 
Dionysius II’s book and Plato’s criticism of writing philosophy is an 
escamotage by which Plato introduces this new topic. But Dionysius 
didn’t write a book on philosophy in order to transgress Plato’s 
orders. Dionysius wrote a book on Platonic philosophy because he 
felt that Plato’s belief that philosophy implies πόνος and 
steadfastness was absurd. Son of a tyrant and a tyrant himself, 
                                                     
10 535b5-c3: Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, 
καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μανθάνειν. πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιῶσι ψυχαὶ ἐν 
ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος 
ἀλλ' οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος.  
Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.  
Καὶ μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ἄρρατον καὶ πάντῃ φιλόπονον ζητητέον. ἢ τίνι τρόπῳ 
οἴει τά τε τοῦ σώματος ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησίν τε 
καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; 
11 Ivi, 12. 
12 I write “Platonic” because the following protest of Plato’s (“I heard that he wrote 
a book on the things he had heard, presenting it as his own work, different from 
the things he had heard”) makes sense if and only if Dionysius’s book was a 
pamphlet on Platonic philosophy, or somehow dependent on Plato’s teachings 
(in Dionysius’s intentions).  
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Dionysius was used to having everything right away. From his point 
of view, it was intolerable that a hobby (since that is precisely what 
philosophy amounted to for him) might require a lot of patience, 
considerable effort, and a moderate lifestyle13.  
Dionysius was sure to know and to possess in adequate manner 
many of the most important things since he had heard them from 
others14. This passage should not be overinterpreted, as the 
trailblazers of the ἄγραφα δόγματα (Unwritten Doctrines) usually 
do. The word μέγιστα does not recall the μέγιστον μάθημα of the 
Republic (504e-505b) and does not allude to the “Theory of Principles” 
that Aristotle attributes to Plato in the Metaphysics.15 Similarly, it 
makes no sense to explain this passage in relation to Plato’s alleged 
public speaking on the Good, as reported by Aristossenus.16 
Morrow’s translation has the merit of avoiding misunderstanding on 
this matter: “for he claimed to have already a sufficient knowledge of 
many of the most important points from his casual conversations 
with others.” With the arrogance typical of powerful men, Dionysius 
thought he could do whatever he wanted; since at that moment he 
wanted to be a philosopher, he wrote a book of philosophy. Any 
other esoteric explanation of this fact is over the top.  
How do people normally react to the πεῖρα?  
As I have said, the πεῖρα has the purpose of distinguishing good 
and bad pupils. People's reaction to the πεῖρα is therefore essential 
in order to select or turn down potential pupils. The Letter 
                                                     
13 On the frugal eating habits at the Academy, see Helian. Var. Hist. 2, 18 and R.S. 
Bluck, Plato’s Life and Thought (London, Routledge & Paul, 1949), 81-82. 
14 341b2-3: πολλὰ καὶ μέγιστα εἰδέναι τε καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων 
παρακοάς. 
15 See Krämer, Arete, 141; Id., Platone e i fondamenti della metafisica. Saggio sulla teoria 
dei principi e sulle dottrine non scritte di Platone, con una raccolta dei documenti 
fondamentali in edizione bilingue e bibliografia, Milano 1982, 105 n. 82; T.A. Szlezák, 
Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie. Interpretationen zun den frühen und 
mittleren Dialogen (Berlin-New York, 1985), 399 ff.; Gundert, Exkurs, 90. 
16 See Krämer, Arete, 404 ff; Gaiser, Platons, 6 f. and 452 nt. 7; contra H. Cherniss, The 
Riddle of the Early Academy (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1945), 1 ff. 
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distinguishes two kinds of reaction. A perspicuous discussion of this 
topic is provided by Tulli, who speaks about three (and not two) 
kinds of reaction17. On his interpretation, my ii. and iia are different 
reactions: 
i. If the listener is a real philosopher and is worthy of doing 
philosophy because of his divine nature (ἐὰν μὲν ὄντως ᾖ 
φιλόσοφος οἰκεῖός τε καὶ ἄξιος τοῦ πράγματος θεῖος ὤν: 
340c1-4), he will think that the philosophical journey is terrific 
and the only possible way of life; 
ii. Those who are not really philosophers (οἱ δὲ ὄντως μὲν μὴ 
φιλόσοφοι), but have only a veneer of δόξαι, “when they see the 
full extent of the learning and labor required, and perceive that 
they must strictly regulate their daily lives if their quest is to be 
successful, conclude that the task is too difficult for their 
powers” 
iia. Some of them persuade themselves that they have been 
sufficiently instructed in the whole topic and no longer require 
further effort (ἔνιοι δὲ αὐτῶν πείθουσιν αὑτοὺς ὡς ἱκανῶς 
ἀκηκοότες εἰσὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι δέονταί τινων 
πραγμάτων). This is the case of Dionysius. 
These reactions shed further light on the content of the πεῖρα. 
What I mean is that no one reacts to it by denying some thesis or 
showing himself perplexed by some aspects of the content. People 
react to the πεῖρα either by concluding that the long, complex and 
demanding work of doing philosophy is a game worth playing, or by 
refusing to face such a struggle, either out of laziness or out of 
arrogance. The first thing that Plato teaches to his potential pupils is 
that philosophy is the only way to attain a happy life, but it is a bone-
crushing and often discouraging labour. “Are you able to bear it? Are 
you ready to make some sacrifices? Are you ready to change your 
life?” The πεῖρα does not go beyond these questions. But it is enough 
to discourage those unfit for the task.  
                                                     
17 See Tulli, Dialettica, 12 ff. 
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The contents of the book 
I wish to briefly get back to Dionysius’s II book. Someone could 
stress the fact that Dionysius reacted to the πεῖρα by writing a book, 
denying what I have said about the purpose of his writing. Indeed, a 
book (any book) has some contents. It is of course possible that Plato 
and Dionysius discussed some philosophical content, but Plato’s 
judgment of this book denies that the problem was its content. In this 
case, Morrow’s translation is misleading: “Later, I hear, he wrote a 
book about what he had heard, putting it forward as an outline of his 
own philosophy, and not as a doctrine he had gotten from me.” The 
Greek says something different: οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούοι 
(341b5). This clearly recalls the previous περὶ ὧν τότε ἤκουσε (b4). 
What the text says is that “Later, I heard that he wrote a book on the 
things he had heard, presenting it as his own work, different from the 
things he had heard.” Plato does not know anything about this book: 
there is no other way to translate οἶδα δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων. Morrow’s 
proposal (i.e. “whether this is true or not I do not know”) is again 
rather misleading. Plato has absolutely no idea of the content of 
Dionysius II’ book (or at least that is what he wants the reader to 
think). But for the mere fact that the tyrant wrote it and did so before 
having adequately studied, he definitely made a mistake.  
Plato now introduces his criticism of writing philosophy. Even 
in this case, however, I would like to dispel the idea that the real 
problem is merely the fact that Dionysius II wrote a book. If he had 
said the same things orally, nothing would have changed. The text 
itself clearly states this: 
I do know that others have written on these same things,18 but I 
don’t know them and they do not even know themselves. And 
this much at least I can affirm with confidence about anyone who 
has written or proposes to write on these things,19 pretending to 
a mastery of the problems with which I am occupied: it matters 
                                                     
18 Morrow translates “on this subject” because he is thinking of a specific topic, such 
as the Good, but this is misleading. 
19 Again, Morrow translates “on this matter.”  
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not whether he claims to have learned what he knows from me 
or some one else or to have discovered it for himself. It is not 
possible, at least in my opinion, that they understood something 
of the enquiry.20 There is no book of mine that expounds these 
things, nor will there ever be one; for this knowledge is not a 
matter that can be transmitted21 like other branches of 
knowledge. […] And this too I know: if these matters are to be 
expounded at all in writings or in oral discourses, it is better that 
they should come from me. Certainly I am harmed more than 
anyone else if these things are misrepresented in a book.22 If I 
thought they ought to be spread abroad in writings or in oral 
discourses, what nobler service could I render mankind during 
my life than to write a book on them? (341b6-e1). 
I have heavily modified Morrow’s translation. Indeed, it insists 
that Dionysius II wrote about something specific. This is also the 
position of many of those who defend the Unwritten Doctrines 
theory. But nothing in the text authorizes such a reading. Plato writes 
that he knows nothing about Dionysius II’s book and that he does not 
even know the others who wrote about his philosophy. He ignores 
what they actually wrote. But the mere fact that they wrote his 
teachings down suggests that they have all gone astray.23 
However, a connection between written and oral speeches is 
drawn twice in just a few lines: γραφέντα ἢ λεχθέντα (in writing 
and in oral discourses) and γραπτέα θ' ἱκανῶς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς 
πολλοὺς καὶ ῥητά (if they ought to be spread abroad in writings and 
in oral discourses). The two participles of γράφω and λέγω, as well 
as γραπτέα and ῥητά, explain that the real problem is not that 
Dionysius II and other anonymous authors wrote books, but that 
                                                     
20 For “of the enquiry” see Tulli, Dialettica, 51. 
21 Morrow adds “in writing,” but this is not in the text. 
22 Morrow omits this, but γεγραμμένα has no other meaning. 
23 See 341b8-c1: τοσόνδε γε μὴν περὶ πάντων ἔχω φράζειν τῶν γεγραφότων καὶ 
γραψόντων, ὅσοι φασὶν εἰδέναι περὶ ὦν ἐγὼ σπουδάζω κτλ, “this is the only 
thing I have to say about who wrote and about who will write saying to know 
what I care about….” It is clear that Dionysius II and those anonymous writers 
wrote books on Plato’s philosophy, not on philosophy in general.  
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they thought it was possible to express the core of Plato’s philosophy 
once and for all in a systematic dissertation. They assumed it was 
possible to treat philosophy as the other branches of knowledge. In 
this respect, there is no difference between writing and speaking 
about philosophy. Philosophy is not a corpus of doctrines that 
someone can communicate through lectures; rather, “it requires long-
continued intercourse between pupil and teacher in joint pursuit of 
the object they are seeking to apprehend; and then suddenly, just as 
light flashes forth when a fire is kindled, this knowledge is born in 
the soul and henceforth nourishes itself.”  
 
Which kind of knowledge is promoted by the Seventh Letter? 
In a recently published book, Myles Burnyeat stated that the 
author of the Seventh Letter (who is not Plato) is “philosophically 
incompetent.” It follows that the letter “is not a trustworthy source of 
information either about Plato’s philosophical development or about 
his biography. It sheds no light on the Academy or on Sicilian 
history.”24 It is not at all clear to me why the author’s philosophical 
incompetence should invalidate his historical credibility (i.e. he could 
be a contemporary of Plato perfectly informed of the facts, but unfit 
to philosophize).25 This is not the place for a detailed refutation of 
Burnyeat’s proposal. What I intend to do in conclusion is to better 
specify why philosophy is not, according to Plato, similar to the other 
branches of knowledge. 
At 341c5-d2, Plato explains that knowledge appears like a spark 
after a long communion with the thing itself, περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτό. 
Philosophy, in other terms, does not proceed by accumulation, step 
by step, but through a long and laborious dialectical exercise that 
produces – assuming it produces something – a sudden 
                                                     
24 M. Burnyeat- M. Frede, The Pseudo-Platonic Seventh Letter, ed. D. Scott (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 122.  
25 The Seventh Letter does not contain any clear anachronism, does not contradict any 
other source, and it is rather trustworthy on the facts concerning Dionysius II’s 
life. See F. Muccioli, Dionisio II: storia e tradizione letteraria, (Bologna, 1999), 
passim.  
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comprehension. This is the reason why the πεῖρα is fundamental: the 
teacher must verify that the pupil can bear this long preliminary 
work. There is a true discourse (λόγος ἀληθής) that condemns 
anyone who dares to write what cannot be written (341a3-6). This 
λόγος states that there are three gnoseological instruments with 
which we have to try to approach knowledge of the thing itself: name 
(ὄνομα), discourse (λόγος),26 and image (εἴδωλον). The fourth thing 
involved in the process of knowing the “fifth” is a set of three kinds 
of knowledge: ἐπιστήμη (science), νοῦς (intellection) and ἀληθής 
δόξα (true opinion).27 We must pass through the four elements to 
reach the fifth (i.e. the thing itself), but “these elements tend to show 
as much the quality of each object as its essence, because of the 
weakness of the discourses.” Anyone who wants to fully (τελέως) 
grasp the fifth must somehow (ἁμῶς γέ πως) get the first four (342e3-
5). Nevertheless, they remain irremediably obscure. The reason is 
explained in a more technical way at 343b6 ff: “being two terms, the 
essence and the quality (τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινος), while the 
soul tries to know not the quality, but the essence, each of the four 
offers the soul, in words and deeds, that which is not sought.” In 
other words, the soul wants to know the τι in itself, the nature of the 
thing, its essence, but our gnoseological tools mix it with the ποῖόν τι 
(the quality). Whoever dares to say the thing itself is therefore easily 
refuted.  
How to get out of this situation? How to try to reach the fifth? At 
343e-344c1, Plato explains that  
only being guided through them [i.e. the first four], going back 
and back, produces with effort, in he who has a good nature, the 
knowledge of what has good nature […] If each of these elements 
– names, discourses, visual images, and perceptions – is rubbed 
with others, with great effort, in benevolent confutations and in 
discussions conducted without hostility, then the knowledge 
                                                     
26 In this context – and in Plato in general – λόγος does not mean “definition,” but 
“discourse”: see Tulli, Dialettica, 27-28.  
27 The fact that science, intellection and true opinion are linked together in a single 
set is not problematic: see Resp. 585b14-c1, Phil. 11b4-c1, 60d4-5, Leg. 688a-b.  
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and the intellection around each thing suddenly flashes, with the 
greatest possible intensity within the limit of human abilities 
(ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων ὅτι 
μἁλιστ’ εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην). 
Some scholars think that what Plato means here is that there is a 
peculiar faculty, i.e. intellection, which is able to overcome the limits 
of human nature and to grab the thing itself in its purity. The 
intellection of the fifth (i.e. the Form) would therefore not be a 
linguistic form of knowledge. This interpretation can be declined in 
two ways: (i) a mystic and (ii) a non-propositional (but rational) one. 
According to (i), the intellection of the fifth is an illogical unio mystica 
with the thing itself; according to (ii), this kind of enlightenment is 
not irrational (in Julius Stenzel’s lexicon, it is a rational Erleuchtung28), 
but it is not verbal.  
In my opinion, it is easy to reject (i). At 340d1-5, where Plato is 
speaking of the philo-sophers, we read that the good pupil is able to 
λογίζεσθαι, which is beyond suspicion a rational act. Pasquali has 
masterfully clarified that at 341c5-d2, where Plato alludes to a 
knowledge that flashes as a spark, he uses the present tense (ἐκ 
πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὰ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ 
συζῆν), as if to say that the communion and the living together will 
continue (unlike a mystical union).29 There’s a fundamental 
difference between knowing (μαθεῖν) and experiencing something 
(παθεῖν), as in Aristotle’s De phil. fr. 15 -- Ross explains: the initiates 
do not have to know (οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν), but to experience something 
and to be in a certain disposition (ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι). 
Quoting the fragment, Michael Psellos is more explicit: the initiates 
do not hear something; their mind passively experiences the 
enlightenment (αὐτοῦ παθόντος τοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἔλλαμψιν)30. Nothing 
like that is described in the Seventh Letter.  
                                                     
28 See J. Stenzel, Plato der Erzieher, (Leipzig, 1928), 270-96, quoted from the Italian 
translation, Bari 1936. 
29 G. Pasquali, Lettere, 86. 
30 Schol. ad Joh. Clim. 6, 171. 
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More interesting and philosophically promising is (ii). On this 
view, defended by Wilhelm Wieland and Francisco Gonzalez (among 
others), the kind of knowledge of which the Seventh Letter speaks is 
rational, but non-propositional.31 This means, to use Gonzalez’s very 
perspicuous summary, that “something can be manifest without 
being describable.” Non-propositional knowledge is beyond true-
false opposition and admits gradation (i.e. it can be more or less 
clear). According to the Wieland-Gonzalez interpretation of the 
Seventh Letter, it is true that the logos says both the essence and the 
quality, but it is false that this is the only kind of knowledge: there is 
a non-logical understanding of the thing in itself. The difference 
between my view and the non-propositional view is therefore that 
both consider the logos a diaphragm, but I think that there is no hope 
of overcoming the diaphragm.32 And this is exactly the reason why 
the Seventh Letter places in the same set episteme, nous and true opinion: 
the nous is higher than episteme and true opinion, but it is not able to 
bridge the distance between us and the “fifth.” The “spark” that 
flares up is not a non-propositional form of knowledge, but the 
precise moment in which the soul understands what the “rubbing” 
of our gnoseological tools shows. The best comment on this is Hegel’s 
Enzyklopädie, § 66: 
immediate knowing is to be taken as a fact. With this, however, 
the consideration is directed towards the field of experience, to a 
psychological phenomenon. - In this respect, it should be noted 
that it is one of the most common experiences that truths (which 
one knows very well to be the result of the most intricate and 
highly mediated considerations) present themselves immediately 
in the consciousness of someone conversant with such 
                                                     
31 See W. Wieland, Plato und die Formen des Wissens, (Göttingen, 1982), esp. 224-36; 
F.J. Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue. Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry, 
(Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1998), esp. ch. 9.. See also F.J. 
Gonzales., “Nonpropositional knowledge in Plato,” Apeiron, 21 (1998): 235-84. 
32 For my general interpretation of the excursus, see F. Forcignanò, “La debolezza 
strutturale del linguaggio nella Settima Lettera di Platone,” in Ética e Filosofia 
Política, XIX/2 (2016); also “Poder e limite da linguagem na Filosofia Antiga,” 
153-79.  
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knowledge. Like everybody else who has been trained in a 
science, the mathematician immediately has at his fingertips 
solutions to which a very complicated analysis has led. (transl. 
Brinkmann-Dahlstrom). 
Dialectic is not a preparation for illumination. The distinction 
between a mediate work and an immediate comprehension is not the 
distinction between two kinds of knowledge. The long and laborious 
work of philosophy can also produce nothing, or take a lifetime. And 
this is the reason why not everyone can philosophize.  
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